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CHAPTER ONE 
1 Introduction 
1.1 The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is a regional community 
formally established in 1980 currently comprising of fifteen Southern African states.1 It has 
its genesis in the anticolonial movement which pervaded the region and the rest of Africa 
from the late 1960s which culminated in the attainment of majority rule in South Africa in 
1994. The establishment of SADC was by no small means a monumental development 
given that Southern Africa is a region of diverse ethnic, political and economic 
configuration with an estimated population of 244 million people. Such tentative steps 
towards transnational regional co-operation is remarkable given that the people of the 
region were emerging from more than a century of oppression, brutalisation, displacement, 
a people whose civilisation was battered and bastardised and denied the basic tenets of 
humanity.  Despite the diversity and the seemingly insurmountable odds averred to, the 
region has managed to reach a milestone which only a few regions of the world have 
managed to accomplish; to fashion and cobble a closely knit regional entity where co-
operation and consensus decision-making is the norm with full and equal participation of 
all the member states.2 
 
SADC was created to pursue quixotic goals which have two interlinked and intertwined 
strands; the promotion of economic growth and socio-economic development aimed at 
eventually eradicating poverty, and the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and 
                                                 
1 SADC member states are Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe 
2 Similar regional groupings include the European Union (EU) Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS). 
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democracy through regional co-operation and integration3.The birth and development of 
SADC underwent through different and often disparate phases. The first phase was from 
the mid 1970s to 1980 where the organisation existed as an informal club of majority-ruled 
southern African states whose main thrust and was to mobilise and co-ordinate military 
resources and political support towards states of Southern Africa who were still under 
minority white rule. The period from 1980 onwards marked a shift in the direction of the 
organisation whose inclination was now on economic development and co-ordination as a 
counterpart to the political and military struggles. This was viewed as a prelude to a total 
economic and political emancipation of the region thereby creating a self sustaining and 
endogenous entity.  Conspicuous at that juncture was some modicum of institutionalisation 
starting  to be visible though fashioned in the most rudimentary form. The period from 
1992 onwards has witnessed the establishment of a fully-fledged regional community order 
with a relatively well established legal and institutional framework.  
 
Regional integration has been in vogue since the end of the Second World War hence it is 
not a phenomenon confined to Southern Africa only. It is a global trend and its 
manifestation in Southern Africa is only an indication that no region can possibly avoid its 
influence.4 Perhaps this is a timely realisation that the modern world has become 
intertwined and interrelated hence a gradual repudiation of preoccupation with statal 
polities with their emphasis on state sovereignty and absolutism on issues conceived to be 
within their exclusive jurisdiction. This is not to disregard and disdain the role of the state 
as the states’ bureaucracies have always been the driving force behind any  integration 
endeavour as evidenced by the EU‘s integration project. SADC’s glide towards regional 
integration is a just a microcosm of the global-wise integration movement for which the EU 
project with its seemingly unstoppable slither towards a total economic and political union 
of Europe provides more than just a precedent in regional integration. Similar trends 
                                                 
3 Oosthuizen (2006) p.39 
4 Mvungi E.A. Sengondo. Towards the Law of Southern African Development Community (SADC). In: 
Yearbook of African Law. Vol.7(1993 ) p.89-102 
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elsewhere include the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)5, the Southern 
Cone Common Market6. Integration initiatives elsewhere in Africa will be discussed 
below.   
integration project will be critically examined and the apposite recommendations proffered. 
 
e focus of research in this thesis. This research intends to answer the following 
uestions: 
 
1.1.1 hat are the aims and objectives of the SADC integration project?  
 
                                                
 
This thesis will therefore attempt to trace the genesis and development of the integration 
project in Southern Africa as epitomised by SADC. This will entail an analysis of the aims 
and objectives of SADC, its institutional and legal structure as well as its position with 
regards to the larger integration initiatives taking place in Africa. This work will further 
attempt to show how the SADC integration project is fundamentally altering the economic, 
social and political landscape in Southern Africa by arguing that Southern Africa is 
mutating towards a supranational order with a constitutional base. The challenges to the 
1.1 Research Questions 
The SADC integration project raises considerable constitutional and legal questions which 
would be th
q
W
 
5 Comprises a membership of 10 states and its objectives include, inter alia, spurring economic growth, social 
progress and promotion of regional peace and stability in the region. 
6 Commonly referred to as the Mercosur project- a regional intergration initiatiative in E.South America 
established in 1991 whose objectives include, inter alia, to increase economic co-operation among the 
countries of the region. 
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1.1.2 What is SADC’s institutional set-up and the legal framework underpinning such 
institutions? What are the competencies of the institutions? 
1.1.3  What are the challenges facing the relationship between SADC institutions and 
national institutions of member states institutions?  
 
 
1.2 Objectives of the Study 
 
The main objective of the study is to carry out a concerted analysis of the main institutions 
of the SADC with a view to discerning their powers and competencies. In that regard, an 
investigation will be made on the competencies of SADC institutions and the competencies 
of national institutions with a view to expose any possible areas of co-operation and 
conflict between the former and latter. The main thrust in the analysis of the above will be 
to interrogate the legal and constitutional implications of the SADC integration project. 
Such an investigation is very important in assessing the suitability of the institutional 
architecture in its mammoth integration project- in that regard any weaknesses that may be 
identified will receive the necessary attention to enable the necessary reform and retooling 
of such to be carried out. An analysis will further be carried out to highlight the position 
and significance of SADC as a regional building block in a larger African integration 
project and this will entail an analysis of the relationship between SADC and the African 
Union (AU). 
 
1.3 Methodology and Sources 
This study will adopt a historical approach. It is the most appropriate so as to give an 
overview of SADC and the development that has taken place from its inception to date.  
 Legal sources such as relevant SADC treaties and the various protocols made thereunder, 
textbooks, specialist and general journals will be reviewed. Newspaper articles and 
appropriate websites will be resorted to as well. Recourse will be had to relevant legal 
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literature on the EU integration project where necessary. In interpreting the various 
materials recourse will be had to the Vienna Convention On the Law of Treaties 1969 as 
well as article 103 of the United Nations Charter. 
 
1.4 Delimitation of the Thesis 
 
1.4.1 Delimitation 
This study will limit itself to the a discussion of the key institutions of SADC 
established under the main SADC treaty  as the scope of this work will not allow 
for an extended discussion of all the SADC bodies established under the various 
protocols. The discussion will further be curtailed to a legal and constitutional 
analysis of such bodies vis a vis the integration project hence aspects of a purely 
economic or commercial nature will only be referred to where expedient to advance 
a particular argument but that would be more of an exception than the norm. 
Reference will be made to some of the institutions of the EU by way of a 
comparative analysis but given the limited scope of this thesis, such reference will 
be more at a superficial level as it is not the intention of the author to carry out a 
comprehensive comparative analysis between the SADC and the EU.  
 
1.4.2 Structure 
Chapter one will be an introduction to this work, the research objectives, an 
identification of sources and the methodological approach to be utilised by the 
author as well as delimitation and an outline of the thesis structure. Chapter two 
will mainly deal with a historical background of SADC, its genesis and 
development over the years. Chapter three will undertake an analysis of the key 
institutions of SADC their powers and competencies. Chapter four will examine the 
legal and constitutional implications of the SADC integration project. Chapter five 
will focus on the relationship between SADC and the AU as well as a discussion of 
other integration projects elsewhere in Africa. Chapter six provides a conclusion to 
this study and makes some recommendations. 
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   CHAPTER TWO 
 
 
2. The Historical Development of SADC 
 
The 1960s to the 1970s was a turning point for much of Africa as it marked the turning 
point in the various struggles for self determination of the people of Africa against the yoke 
of colonialism, apartheid and minority oppression. International solidarity, unity and a 
sense of a shared destiny started to pervade the whole of Africa which culminated in the 
launching of the Organisation on African Unity (the ‘OAU’)7 which was to become the 
forum for the mobilisation of military, political and diplomatic endeavours to untangle 
Africa from the shackles of political oppression. Such is captured in the timeless words of 
one of the founding fathers of African Renaissance, Kwameh Nkrumah who opined that 
‘Seek ye first the political kingdom and all other things shall be added unto you’8.  It is in 
this anti-colonial march for Africa’s liberation that saw the birth of SADC. This chapter 
will endeavour to trace the historical origins of SADC as informal club devoid of any legal 
standing. It will be shown how the regional bureaucrats developed and institutionalised 
SADC into a fully a fully-fledged supranational order with a sound legal basis.  
 
2.1 From Frontline States to the Lusaka Declaration 
 
The aggressive response by the colonial and white settler regimes in Mozambique, 
Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia and South Africa to the de-colonisation process led to long 
wars of liberation led by the liberation movements in these territories9. The majority ruled 
states in Southern Africa became a target for attacks particularly emanating from apartheid 
South Africa because of the former’s support of liberation movements in the region. These 
                                                 
7 Organisation of African Unity established on 25th May 1963. 
8 The Statesman(2007) p 15 
9 Mvungi (1993) p.89 
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majority ruled states, led by their respective presidents founded the Frontline States ( ‘the 
FLS’), an informal political club with two main objectives, namely collective self defence 
for the majority-ruled states and secondly, coordination of military, political and diplomatic 
support for Southern Africa’s liberation movements.10 The turning point came when 
Portugal relinquished its two colonies in the region, in 1975, with Zimbabwe attaining its 
independence on 18th April 1980 leaving the apartheid regime, which had, for all intents 
and purposes, become hostis human generis, with apartheid ideology firmly entrenched in 
South Africa and its tentacles spread to Namibia in wilful defiance of the international 
community.11  
 
The FLS remained an informal political club with no legal standing nor institutionalisation 
of any sort. Leaders of the majority-led states and the leaders of the liberation movements 
met on ad hoc basis to strategise on the military, political and diplomatic support to be 
rendered to those countries in the region still languishing under the yoke of colonial 
domination. The main achievement was the independence of Zimbabwe12which left South 
Africa the only stumbling block towards the complete political liberation of Southern 
Africa. 
 
 
2.2 The Lusaka Declaration 
 
There was a realisation within the region that the positive experiences gained in working 
together in the FLS to advance the political emancipation of Southern Africa, had to be 
                                                 
10 The founders were the national leaders of Tanzania(Julius Nyerere), Zambia (Kenneth  Kaunda), and 
Botswana) Seretse Khama –see Oosthuizen (2006) p53 
11 The United Nations responed by passing GA Res.1761/1962 which condemned apartheid as a threat to 
international peace and security, SC Res.181/1963 and 418/1977 which, inter alia, imposed embargoes on 
South Africa. 
12 Osthuizen (2006) p.59 
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translated into broader co-operation of economic and social development13.  The leaders of 
the nine majority ruled states in Southern Africa met on the 1st April 1980 in which the 
Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC), the predecessor to 
SADC, was founded by what is euphemistically referred to as the Lusaka Declaration (the 
Declaration) whose theme was titled: Southern Africa: Towards Economic Liberation14. 
The adoption of the Declaration consequently the establishment of SADCC was a major 
achievement for Southern African states because at the same time apartheid South Africa 
was peddling its own blue print for Southern Africa integration dubbed ‘a Constellation of 
Southern African States’, which to its progenitor’s chagrin, did not get any buyer. Though 
the Declaration does not expressly refer to SADC, it paved the way for its formal 
establishment on 1st July 1981, and was the general framework within which co-operation 
within SADCC took place15.  
 
The leaders articulated the following as their main objectives in the establishment of the 
new entity; 
• To reduce member states’ economic dependence, particularly but not only on 
apartheid South Africa; 
•  To forge links to create a genuine and equitable regional integration;  
• To mobilise member states’ resources, in the quest for collective self reliance, and 
• To ensure international understanding and support;16 
The objectives reflect a stark acknowledgement that the region was economically reliant on 
South Africa, the economic giant of the region. The Southern African bureaucrats 
identified the establishment of a regional transport and communications system less 
integrated with that of South Africa as the key to co-operation in other areas, especially for 
                                                 
13 www.sadc.int/abtsadc/history.php 
14 The founder member states were Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Swaziland, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
15 Oosthuizen(2006) p59 
16 http://www.sadc.int/abt_sadc/history.php 
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the landlocked states of the region17.  An indication that the regional leaders were 
extremely anxious for the region to disengage itself from apartheid South Africa’s 
economic dominance is aptly captured in the statement by the late Sir Sereste Khama on 
the occasion of the Lusaka Declaration who asserted that: 
 
Our goal is to achieve economic liberation and to reduce our economic dependence 
on ... South Africa. We seek to overcome the fragmentation of our economies and 
by co-ordinating our national development efforts, to strengthen them. The basis of 
our co-operation, built on concrete projects and specific programmes rather than 
grandiose schemes and massive bureaucratic institutions must be assured mutual 
advantage of all participating states.18 
 
 It is significant to note that the Declaration was more of a quixotic aspiration with no legal 
status and was not legally binding on the member states19. 
 
2.3 Memorandum of Understanding and the SADCC Institutional Framework 
 
The SADCC heads of state and government signed a Memorandum of Understanding 
(‘MOU’) on 20th July 1981 in Harare, Zimbabwe establishing the institutions of SADCC 
and delineating their powers and competencies. The MOU further stated that SADCC was 
granted the legal capacity necessary for the exercise of its competencies20. This no doubt 
put SADCC on a legal footing with the MOU legally binding on the member states. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17 Oosthuizen (2006) p61 
18 Mhone (1991) p181(quoting from SADC Handbook page 3) 
19 Segondo (1993) p93 
20 Provided for in the MOU. 
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2.3.1  SADCC Institutional Framework 
 
The MOU created the Summit of Heads of State or Government (SADCC Summit), the 
supreme policy-making institution which met annually; the Council of Ministers (SADCC 
Council), comprising mainly ministers responsible for economic affairs;  Sectorial 
Commissions, the Southern African Centre for Co-operation in Agricultural Research 
(SACCAR) and  the Southern African Transport and Communications Centre (SATCC); 
the Standing Committee of Officials (SCOs) and the Secretariat-whose task was to liaise 
with other institutions and national SADCC structures21. The SADCC institutional 
structure was novel and pioneering as it manifested a departure from a traditional 
intergovernmental organisation in that it kept institutionalisation to the very minimum. It 
has also been pointed out that such innovation was moulded on the experience of the 
FLS22. SADCC’s emphasis was more on the identification of areas of activities; only 
thereafter will institutions be set to co-ordinate activities in the identified areas rather than 
vice versa23. The SADCC secretariat, which was international in character and based at the 
SADCC headquarters in Botswana, was very slim and streamlined and relatively weak. 
This state of affairs, it was argued by its progenitors, was in keeping with the uniqueness of 
the new regional order as it was said to be: 
                                                
 
Deliberately businesslike approach, in which institutions follow achievement-surely 
promises greater dynamism rather than in a system in which member governments 
merely react to proposals put forward by technocrats lodged in a centralised 
bureaucracy24.  
 
21 Oosthuizen (2006)p60. 
22 Ibid. 
23 The rationale for this, as one secretariat document explained was that  ’SADDC has  viewed institutions as 
facilitating and consequential rather than causative forces or ends in themselves. Therefore it has consistently 
sought to develop concrete areas of activity and to identify their actual servicing first, and then only to create 
institutional structures’ (SADCC, Blantyre, Malawi, 1981 p.17). 
24 Masire in SADCC, Record of SADDC Summit, Harare, 20th July 1981, pp19-20. 
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 It is doubtful that the real motive for establishing such an institutional structure was solely 
motivated by the desire for efficiency.  This is because the secretariat did not possess any 
meaningful powers and competencies to execute SADCC projects on its own initiative. The 
answer perhaps lies in the fact that most of the SADCC member states had at some point in 
time suffered under colonial domination, and for countries like Angola, Mozambique and 
newly independent Zimbabwe, such experiences were still fresh and naturally it was not 
uncommon for them to be inclined towards religiously guarding their newly acquired state 
sovereignty as their shibboleth rather than ceding their sovereign competencies to a 
supranational body. It is also significant to note that most of the member states’ ideological 
outlook was premised on the Marxist ideology and its fixation with absolutism as the 
hallmark of statehood. Perhaps that explains the member-states’ reluctance to devolve more 
powers and competencies to the secretariat as such devolution of powers would have, in 
their view, constituted a deleterious inroad in their sovereign competencies. The above 
observations are further buttressed by the degree to which the responsibility for carrying 
out the regional programs was carried out.  Rather than being delegated to the 
intergovernmental body or a supranational institution they were actually being performed 
by national governments as will be shown below. It is submitted that such an institutional 
setup was in the interests of the member states in order to maintain an apposite equilibrium 
between the national and the intergovernmental institutions. 
 
The primary responsibility for execution of SADCC projects was mandated to national 
governments in the co-ordination of SADCC activities.  The determination to attenuate the 
secretariat’s authority can be seen in the Lusaka summit’s approval of a distribution of a 
scheme of sectoral responsibilities. The modus operandi was for member states to submit 
projects which are nationally based in specified sectors but which must also contribute 
towards regional objectives25. Member states were thus allocated specific developmental 
sectors to coordinate in which they were perceived to have a particular national interest, 
                                                 
25 Leysens Anthony Por J.(SADC: Challenges and Problems) pp 378-379 
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thus giving a state the impetus to develop and coordinate  regional policies and strategies in 
its allocated sector26. The Lusaka Summit also adopted a Program of Action which 
identified the strategic areas where it was deemed as requiring urgent action for functional 
co-ordination at the regional level. This eventually led to the allocation of the identified 
sectors and subsectors to the member states.27 
 
 
2.4 The Legal Status of SADCC 
 
A notion has been advanced which in the author’s view is quite erroneous that the SADCC 
MOU left SADCC on a non legal basis28. Segondo29 forcefully highlights the following as 
indicative of his faulty assessment that SADCC was ‘a mere gentlemen’s club which could 
not be said to constitute a regional arrangement’, and that ‘the institutional arrangement did 
not create any regional legal order’. He further argues that the SADCC MOU did not 
constitute a treaty as envisaged under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(VCLT)30 simply because the MOU was signed but had no provision for ratification and 
submission to international arbitration31. He further points out that the fact that the failure 
to deposit the SADCC instruments with the Secretary General of the United Nations (UN) 
meant that parties ‘were not eager to subject themselves to institutions of arbitration under 
the UN system.’32 Segondo therefore concludes, after a specious analysis of state practice, 
that the state parties did not intend to create legally binding obligations by signing the 
                                                 
26 ibid 
27 The sectors were allocated as follows: Angola-Energy, Botswana-Livestock Production and Animal 
Disease Control, Lesotho-Tourism, Mozambique- Transport and Communications, Swaziland-Manpower 
Development, Tanzania-Industry and Trade, Zambia-Mining and Zimbabwe-Food Security. 
28 Segondo (1993) p.93 
29 Ibid pp94-98 
30 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties adopted May 23, 1969 
31 Segondo (1993) p96-97 
32 Ibd  p.97 
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MOU hence SADCC as a regional integration arrangement did not create a legal regime 
under international law33. 
 
The flaws in the above reasoning are conspicuous. It is stating the obvious that binding 
international agreements can take disparate forms hence intent of the parties as to whether 
they had in mind creation of legally binding obligations and rights cannot be based solely 
on the form or nomenclature given to the treaty-like instrument. Formal provisions of 
treaty-like instruments are not necessarily reliable indicators that the parties intended the 
instrument to constitute a treaty, even though they may point in that direction.34 The issue 
was clarified by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Maritime Delimitation and 
Territorial Questions case.35 The case dealt with whether the Doha-agreed minutes signed 
by the respective senior representatives from Qatar, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia could be 
regarded as a treaty instrument embodying binding legal rights and obligations for Qatar 
and Bahrain. The majority made a finding that the Doha Minutes constituted an 
international agreement embodying rights and obligations for the parties. It is submitted 
that it was not the form, but rather the content of the minutes which persuaded the majority 
to reach that conclusion. In a related finding in the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case36 the 
court toed the same line by affirming that there was no rule of international law 
determining that joint a communiqué may not become an internationally binding 
agreement.  It is significant to note that the ICJ considered article 2(1)(a) of VCLT which 
gives a concise definition of a treaty as  one of the guiding principles of international law in 
reaffirming its position.  
 
It is therefore hardly controversial to come to the inexorable conclusion that by virtue of 
the MOU, the leaders established SADCC as a regional intergovernmental organisation, 
creating mutual rights and obligations binding on its creators inter se. What the MOU did 
                                                 
33 Ibid p.99 
34 Klabbers (1997) p748 
35 Qatar  v Bahrain  
36 Greece v Turkey 
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was to create a self-contained regional legal order which clearly delineated the member’s 
responsibilities as well as providing for a dispute resolution mechanism.  
 
The MOU further provided for a dispute resolution in the form of negotiation and 
conciliation, a position consistent with the UN Charter37, and further provided for the 
Summit to have the final decision in the event of impasse between the disputing parties38. 
A further indication that the founders intended to create a regional legal regime is 
established beyond doubt by a provision specifically stating that the member states’ 
obligations assumed under the MOU shall survive the termination of membership of such 
state.39 This clearly shows that SADCC was neither an informal organisation nor a 
‘gentlemen’s club’ but an intergovernmental organisation based on a sound legal order 
which created mutual rights and obligations for the member states with a sound and clear 
dispute settlement system. It is further to be noted that the UN, in a General Assembly 
resolution passed way back in 1982  titled Co-operation between the UN and the Southern 
Africa Development Co-ordination Conference40formally recognised SADCC as a 
‘subregional organisation whose work is consistent with the objectives and principles 
enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations’41 and that SADCC has been ‘mandated by 
states concerned to co-ordinate projects and programmes within its competence’42. The UN 
General Assembly passed another resolution in 1983 urging the international community 
and UN agencies to forge links and co-operation agreements with SADCC43. 
 
 
 
                                                 
37 See Article 33(1) of the Charter of the United Nations adopted on June 26, 1945 
38 See Article XV of the MOU on the Institutions of SADCC 
39 Article XVI of the MOU on the institutions of SADCC 
40 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 37/248 of 21st December 1982  
41 ibid 
42 ibid 
43 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 38/160 of 15 December 1983. 
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2.5 SADCC to SADC:  From Development Conference to a Community Order 
 
On the 17th August 1992, at Windhoek, Namibia, Heads of State and Government of 10 
SADCC states44under the theme document; SADCC: Towards Economic Integration, 
signed the Declaration(Windhoek Declaration) and the Treaty of the SADC (the Treaty)45 
which replaced the SADCC MOU. This development marked the transformation of 
SADCC from a development conference as established under the SADDC MOU to a fully-
fledged regional community order as encapsulated in the Treaty, the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC). There has been a plethora of explanations and 
interpretations as to the raisson d’etre for this organisational metamorphosis though the 
limited scope of this thesis will not permit an exhaustive interrogation of such. The 
Windhoek Declaration postulated, inter alia, the following as the factors driving the 
transformation process: Namibia’s independence (21st March 1990), the approaching 
demise of the apartheid regime in South Africa (which became independent in 1994), peace 
prospects in Angola and Mozambique (the two counties had fallen into the throws of civil 
war with the South African  apartheid regime heavily involved in those wars as part of its 
destabilisation program in Southern Africa), the need to reform the region’s economic 
policies, the worldwide trend to form regional economic co-operation and integration 
blocks and the emphasis of perceiving regional economic communities as building blocks 
towards a continental economic community46. 
 
Some authors have pointed out that SADCC was neither a great failure nor a great success 
in meeting its four goals, firstly adumbrated in the Lusaka Declaration and affirmed at 
Harare in 198147. It has been pointed out that the SADCC member states were still 
dependent on South Africa at the adoption of the Windhoek Declaration and the Treaty in 
                                                 
44 Namibia became the 10th SADDC member upon its attaining independence in 1990 
45 Treaty of the SADC signed at Windhoek on 17th August 1992 and entered into force on 30th September 
1993 
46 SADCC Windhoek Declaration: SADCC: Towards Economic Integration 
47 Oosthuizen (2006) p69 
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1992 than they had envisaged48. It is further pointed out that regional integration was a 
stated objective in the Lusaka Declaration but in truth the same declaration and SADCC’s 
policies did not really envisage much more than the co-ordination of some activities in 
certain functional areas hence the need to revitalise the regional entity49. It is submitted that 
one of the motivating factors in transforming SADCC to SADC was the need to shift the 
focus of the organisation from co-ordination of development projects to a more complex 
task of integrating the economies of member states and that the Treaty was to be a blueprint 
for building a Community of Southern African States50-an affirmation that pursuit of statal 
interests had hitherto taken precedence over a genuine quest for regional objectives-a 
lodestar the founding fathers had when they launched the integration project. 
 
2.6 Amended Declaration and SADC Treaty 
 
On the 14th August 2001 the SADC leaders signed an agreement amending the original 
Treaty of 1992 (‘Amended Treaty’ or ‘Treaty’ or ‘SADC Treaty’)  as well as numerous 
protocols on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation, firearms, information and 
communications technology among others. This was a culmination of a concerted process 
which involved a surgery of the institutional structure of SADC as encapsulated through 
two major reports; the 1993 report titled –A Framework and Strategy For Building and 
Strategy as well as the 1997 report titled-Review and Rationalisation of SADC Programme 
of Action51. Among some of the recommendations to be discerned from the 
aforementioned reports was a call for a transformation of SADC institutions to facilitate 
deeper integration as it was poignantly noted that: 
                                                 
48 Ibid –states that in 1986, 30% of South Africa’s exports headed to SADC while it souced only 7% of its 
imports from them. 
49 Ibid  
50 http://www.sadc.int/abt_sadc/history.php 
51 See Oosthuizen (2006) pp 99-102 
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integration implies that some decisions previously taken by states alone, are taken 
collectively in regional institutions and that decisions taken nationally give due 
consideration to regional positions and circumstances52. 
The statement clearly entrenches an acknowledgement that for deeper integration to take 
place, there was a need for unequivocal commitment to supranationalism, that is for 
member states to cede some of their sovereign competencies to SADC. Some of the 
recommendations entailed strengthening of the Secretariat, push for the Organ on Politics 
and Defence Co-operation to be subsumed within the SADC institutional structure, a new 
equitable formula for membership contributions to be found and a call to enhance greater 
participation of non-state actors in the regional integration project such as the private 
sector, civil society, workers and employers’ organisations among others53. The bulk of the 
recommendations were by and large incorporated in the amended SADC Treaty and were 
fully reflected in the new institutional architecture of the regional community as will be 
shown below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
52 See Oosthuizen (2006) p102 
53 op cit 
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    CHAPTER THREE 
   
 
3. The Key Institutions of SADC 
 
Chapter five of the SADC Treaty sets out the eight key institutions of the regional entity. It 
must be noted that institutional development in any integration initiative elsewhere shows 
that institutions are an integral part of a successful development and integration initiative. 
This chapter will endeavour to highlight the SADC institutional architecture to assess its 
suitability to drive the integration project in Southern Africa. Reference will be made to the 
EU with a view to enhance the former to learn form the successes and avoid the mistakes of 
the latter. A descriptive approach will be adopted in order to lay the basis for a 
comprehensive analysis of such institutional structure to be carried out in Chapter 4 with a 
view to assess whether or not they reflect strides towards supranationalism by the regional 
entity.   
 
3.1 The Summit of Heads of State or Government 
 
The Summit of Heads of State or Government (‘the Summit’) is the supreme policy making 
institution of SADC and its various powers and competencies are fully enumerated in the 
Treaty54. It is constituted by the heads of state or government of all the member states and 
is chaired and co-chaired by a Chairperson and a Deputy Chairperson elected from among 
its members for one year on a rotational basis55. It is the body mandated with setting the 
SADC agenda as it sets the overall policy direction and control of the functions of SADC56. 
The Summit is mandated with a number of executive functions which include the 
admission of new members to SADC, as well as determining the procedures for the 
                                                 
54 Ibid Article 10 
55 Ibid. 
56 ibid 
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admission of new members57, appointment of  the Executive Secretary and his/her Deputy 
as well as judges of the SADC’s judicial organ, the Tribunal. It is also mandated to take 
enforcement action against any delinquent member through the imposition of sanctions58. 
The Summit is also imbued with legislative functions which include the adoption of the 
various instruments of implementation of the provisions of the Treaty, that is protocols in 
SADC parlance, amendment of the SADC Treaty or any other treaty or protocol made 
under the rubric of SADC59. It also has powers ‘to create committees, other institutions and 
organs as it may deem necessary’60. The above clearly shows that the powers of the summit 
are enormous. The Treaty also makes it clear that the Summit shall be responsible for 
‘control of the functions of SADC’61. There is no doubt that the pace and direction of the 
SADC integration project will be mainly determined by the heads of state or government 
acting through the Summit. This is particularly pronounced by the fact that the Summit is 
the only community institution with powers to legislate within SADC’s areas of 
integration62. Other institutions can only do so as delegates of the Summit63.This, as will be 
shown in the next chapter, puts SADC on an unhealthy footing institutionally. This is 
exacerbated by the fact that the Treaty does not explicitly provide for any judicial review of 
the Summit decisions. In most of the member states’ national jurisdictions, it is not 
uncommon for the acts of the head of state to be subject to parliamentary scrutiny or 
judicial oversight. 
 
  It is significant to emphasise that decisions of the Summit are binding on all the SADC 
institutions and member states. Such decisions are taken by consensus though there are 
some key exceptions which require unanimity such as the admission of a new member,64or 
                                                 
57 Ibid Article 8 
58 SADC Treaty- Article 33 
59 Ibid-Article 22(2) 
60 Op cit 
61 SADC Treaty-Article 10(2) 
62 Ibid-Article 10(3) 
63 Ibid 
64 SADC treaty-Article 8(4) 
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those requiring assent from three quarters of the Summit’s membership for adoption, for 
example amendment of the Treaty and/or the dissolution of SADC or any of its 
institutions65.  
 
A slight similarity can be observed between the Summit of the SADC and the European 
Council whose role is affirmed in the Treaty on the European Union (the Maastricht 
Treaty)66. The Maastricht Treaty provides that the European Council shall provide the 
Union with the necessary impetus and shall define the general guidelines 
thereof67.Similarly with the Summit, the European Council is composed of the Heads of 
State or Government and the President of the European Commission68. In contradistinction 
to the Summit, it must be noted that the European Council is not a formal institution of the 
European Union (EU) and has no formal executive or legislative powers. Although it 
defines the EU policy agenda and thus been considered to dictate speed of European 
integration, it does so without explicit powers save the influence it has of being composed 
of national leaders. The SADC institutional structure, particularly the enormous legislative 
and executive powers reposited in the Summit greatly reflects the desire by the political 
leadership to be in total control of the integration project and the reluctance to devolve any 
meaningful powers to other community institutions-the hallmark of intergovernmentalism 
and its preoccupation with statism. But as will be noted below, SADC is a region in a flux 
and indeed other community institutions are playing a fundamental role in the integration 
project. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
65 Ibid-Article 35 
66 See Article 4 Treaty on the European Union signed on the 7th February 1992 at Maastricht. 
67 ibid 
68 ibid 
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3.2 The Council of Ministers 
 
The Council of Ministers (‘COM’ or ‘Council’) is composed of one minister from each 
member state and in most cases ministers responsible for foreign relations69, a departure 
from SADCC and the original SADC Treaty where the COM was composed of ministers 
responsible for financial or economic affairs. This marks a shift towards deeper integration 
permeating the economic, social and political space of the region. Whereas the Summit, as 
alluded to above, controls the functions of SADC, the Treaty states that the Council shall 
have the responsibility to ‘oversee the functioning and development of SADC’70.   
 
At any point the Council is headed by a chairperson and a deputy chairperson who are 
appointed by the state  holding the positions of chairperson and deputy chairperson of the 
Summit respectively.71 The COM’s mandate includes approval of SADC policies, 
strategies and work programmes, development of its common agenda and strategic 
priorities, overseeing the functioning and development of SADC, implementation of its 
policies and proper execution of such identified programmes72. The COM is also involved 
in personnel functions as it recommends to the Summit persons for appointment as 
Executive Secretary and Deputy Executive Secretary of SADC73. The COM is also 
responsible for compiling and submitting a list of potential judges for appointment to the 
Tribunal which it recommends to the Summit74 as well as designating members who shall 
sit regularly on the Tribunal75as well as determining the conditions of service of the judges, 
the registrar as well as the Tribunal’s other staff members76. The Council is also imbued 
with financial responsibilities which include the identification of supplementary sources to 
                                                 
69 See SADC Treaty- Article 11 
70 Ibid-Article 11(2)(a)  
71 Ibid 
72 ibid 
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74 See Protocol and the Rules of Procedure thereof- Article 4(4) 
75 Ibid –Article 3(2) 
76 Ibid-Article 12(3) 
 27
fund the SADC budget, it approves the SADC’s budget and approves the annual statements 
of accounts for the Secretariat and financial regulations submitted by the Executive 
Secretary77. The COM’s mandate also transcends to institutional development where it has 
the powers to create its own committees, recommends to the Summit for the establishment 
of new SADC institutions and bodies78. The Council also performs advisory functions to 
the Summit on matters of overall policy79 as well as consideration and recommendation to 
the Summit of applications for SADC membership80. 
 
It is noteworthy that the Treaty does not provide for flexible membership in the COM 
seeing that its mandate is very broad and more often it will be called to deal with disparate 
issues. This is a potential area of reform which shall be fully discussed in the following 
chapter. The mandate of the COM is also too broad and extensive to be left to organ. As 
has been shown below, this body has broad executive functions as it is involved in the 
admission of new members to SADC, the appointment of judges of the SADC Tribunal and 
appointment of the personnel of the Secretariat. The COM also has broad financial 
oversight over the SADC finances as has been alluded to above. This would not have been 
a problem if the membership of the COM is not fixed but varies depending on the subject 
matter under discussion. This therefore means that the regional body’s foreign ministers 
find themselves dangling with legal, economic, financial, personnel and political affairs of 
SADC. As will be shown below, there is a need for the COM membership to be flexible 
whereby its composition at any point in time would be determined by the subject matter 
under discussion. There is a further need for SADC to expressly adopt the principle of 
subsidiarity and entrench it into the Treaty. This will make sure that decisions are made at 
the micro level thereby enhancing efficiency. One wonders why the COM should be 
responsible for the staffing of the Secretariat when such duties can be carried out by the 
Executive Secretary, the head of the Secretariat. It is submitted that there is a need to visit 
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this unhealthy state of affairs with a view to giving more powers to the Executive Secretary 
on the appointment of SADC staff with the exception of appointments to the positions of 
Executive Secretary and Deputy Executive Secretary as well as the appointment of the 
judges of the Tribunal. Such will resonate well with the supranationalisation of the SADC 
polity currently in vogue.   
 
3.3 The Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation 
 
The Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (the ‘OPDSC) is one of the SADC institutions 
also established under the Treaty81. Its structure, composition, objectives, powers and 
competencies are fully elaborated in the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-
operation (the ‘OPDSC Protocol’82. It appears that the need to establish a regional mutual 
defence and collective security mechanism as envisaged under Chapter III of the UN 
Charter83 may have been the main motivation behind the establishment of this institution. It 
is instructive to note that the preamble to the OPDSC Protocol makes reference to Chapter 
III of the United Nations which: 
recognises the role of regional arrangements in dealing with such matters 
relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are 
appropriate for regional action84. 
The preamble further states that ‘The Organ constitutes an appropriate institutional 
framework by which member states can co-ordinate policies and activities in the area of 
politics, defence and security’85. 
 
                                                 
81 See SADC Treaty-Article 9 
82 See the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation adopted on 14th August 2001. 
83 See Article 52(1) of the UN Charter which provides that  ’Nothing in the present Charter precludes the 
existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of 
international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or 
agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. 
84 See Article 52 of the Charter of the United Nations 
85 Ibid 
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3.3.1 Institutional Structure of the OPDSC 
 
The OPDSC is chaired by a chairperson who is also a member of the Summit (ie a head of 
Sate or Government) and it operates a unique system decision-making system called the 
‘Troika’-a system which vests decision-making powers in the incumbent chairperson of the 
institution in question, the incoming chairperson who would be the deputy chairperson at 
the time and the immediate previous chairperson in between the meetings of the OPDSC. 
The idea of such a system, which must be lauded as a dynamic innovation, is to enable 
expeditious decision-making and implementation and provision of policy directions in 
between meetings of the SADC institutions86. The Troika of the OPDSC is composed of 
the sitting Chairperson, a Deputy Chairperson (who is also a head of State or Government 
as well as the incoming chairperson) and the outgoing chairperson87 who are elected by the 
Summit for a duration of one year88. The OPDSC protocol also provides for a Ministerial 
Committee (‘the MC’) as an integral organ of the OPDSC89. The MC is composed of 
respective ministers of defence, foreign affairs, public security and state security from each 
member state. The ODPSC Protocol further provides that the MC shall be chaired by a 
minister from the same member state as the chairperson of the OPDSC90. Two further 
bodies complete the current institutional structure of the OPDSC, an Inter-State Politics and 
Diplomatic Committee (‘the ISPDC’)91and an Interstate Defence and Security Committee 
(the ‘ISDSC)92. The ISPDC is composed of ministers responsible for foreign affairs from 
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the member states whereas the member states’ ministers responsible for defence, public 
security and state security constitute the ISDSC although the SADC secretariat provides 
secretariat services to the OPDSC as a whole. It is also significant to point that the ISPDC 
and the ISDSC are both chaired by respective ministers who must be from the same 
member state as the chairperson of the OPDSC93.  The practical implications of this 
arrangement is that at any point in time the OPDSC, the MC, the ISPDC and the ISDSC 
will be chaired by nationals from the same state. The two latter bodies, which are for all 
intents and purposes subsidiaries of the MC report to the latter. 
 
3.3.2 Objectives and Competencies of the OPDS 
 
The objectives of the OPDSC, which are clearly stipulated in the OPDSC Protocol include 
the promotion of peace and security in the region, safeguarding the region against 
instability arising from the breakdown of law and order as a result of inter-state, intra-state 
conflict and aggression as well as the resolution of such conflicts by pacific means with a 
possibility of a consideration of enforcement action in accordance with international law as 
a matter of last resort where peaceful means have failed94. The OPDS ‘s remit also includes 
the promotion of political co-operation among state parties and the promotion of common 
political values and institutions, security, defence,  the development of a common foreign 
and security policy approaches on issues of mutual concern and advance such policy on the 
international fora. The OPDSC’s mandate also extends to the promotion of development of 
democratic institutions and practices within the territories of state parties and to encourage 
the observance of human rights, the development of collective security capacity and mutual 
defence pact to respond to external threats and cross border crime, co-ordination of 
participation of the state parties in international and regional peace-keeping operations and 
the co-ordination of international humanitarian assistance95. The OPDSC protocol also 
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provides that the OPDSC may enter into international agreements with other international 
entities subject to approval by the Summit96. 
 
The OPDSC is without doubt the defence and security organ of SADC as reflected in its 
constituent instrument which has been extensively referenced above. It must however be 
noted that the OPDSC is not independent from the Summit. If anything, it is a ‘department’ 
within SADC given the fact that like the Summit, it is chaired and co-chaired by a head of 
state or government. It is virtually impossible to see the OPDSC taking a decision which is 
not supportable by the Summit. The OPDSC’s relevance was tested recently following the 
debacle arsing from the elections in Zimbabwe held on 29 March 2008. Despite the 
concrete proof of heinous human rights abuses mainly committed by state functionaries 
against ordinary civilians, the OPDSC responded by holding fruitless meetings, often 
shunned by other member states which culminated in a meek and innocuous communiqué 
being released to the media by the OPDSC Troika97. This was despite the fact that the 
situation in Zimbabwe was characterised by state sponsored massive violations of human 
rights involving extra-judicial killings, beatings, intimidation, forced disappearances and 
widespread torture98.  There is therefore an imperative need to wean the OPDSC from the 
clutches of the Summit so it can execute its Treaty mandate99 without being circumscribed. 
The OPDSC’s surprising impotence in the face of the Zimbabwean crisis despite the fact 
that such fell within its treaty mandate clearly calls for its overhaul.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
96 Article 10 of the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security 
97 See Communique issued by the SADC Troika on OPDSC 25 June 2008 at  Lozitha Palace, Kingdom of 
Swaziland on www.sadc.int (visited 17 July 2008) 
98 See June 2008 Human Rights Watch Report on Zimbabwe titled ‘Bullets for Each of You’ State Sponsored 
Violence since Zimbabwe’s March 29 Elections available at www.hrw.org (visited on 17 July 2008). 
99 See Article 5(4) on the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation 
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 3.4 Integrated Committee of Ministers 
 
This is an institution whose composition comprises two ministers from each member 
state100. It appears that the ministers in question need not be necessarily be from a specified 
portfolio from their member states as the Treaty is silent on that. The Integrated Committee 
of Ministers (ICM) is chaired by a minister and deputy minister who shall be appointed 
from the member states holding the chairpersonship and deputy chairpersonship of the 
COM101. The Treaty provides that ICM has to meet at least twice a year, shall report to the 
COM and decision-making shall be by way of consensus though no provision is made as to 
the procedure where consensus cannot be attained102. 
 
3.4.1 Functions and Competencies of the ICM 
The ICM has an oversight on SADC’s integration activities such as trade, finance and 
investment, agriculture and natural resources, social and human development among 
others103. It also has a monitoring role in the implementation of the Regional Indicative 
Strategic Development Plan, SADC’s blue print for economic development and integration 
of the region. The ICM is also imbued with rendering policy guidance to the Secretariat 
and managing the work of the directorates in the Secretariat.104 The ICM is endowed with 
specific powers to make decisions on matters pertaining to such directorates as well as 
creation of permanent and ad hoc subcommittees as may be necessary to cater for any 
cross-cutting sectors105. 
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102 Ibid-Artcile 12(5) to (7) 
103 Ibid –Article 12(2) 
104 ibid 
105 ibid 
 33
It is noteworthy that since the Treaty provides that the ICM shall have at least two 
ministers from each member state as pointed above, meaning that, as SADC is currently 
constituted, that body will not have less than thirty ministers. It makes it even more bizarre 
when one notes that the ICM reports to the COM, another body composed of ministers of 
foreign affairs from the member states as alluded to above. One wonders how effective 
such an institutional structure is when one has to report to and is accountable to his peer as 
is the case here. The sheer number of the ministers constituting the ICM also raises 
eyebrows.  Such is likely to impact on the decision making process by making decision 
long drawn-out and tedious. The very idea of having ministers constituting the ICM should 
be revisited. As has been shown above, this body has an oversight over SADC’s integration 
activities106, it will be advisable to have such a body composed by technocrats in the 
respective areas of integration.   
 
3.5 The Standing Committee of Officials 
 
The Standing Committee of Officials (‘the SCO’) is composed of one permanent secretary 
or an official of equivalent position from each member state who must come from the 
ministry that is the SADC National Contact Point 107. The SCO chairperson and Deputy 
Chairperson are appointed from the member states holding the chairmanship and deputy 
chairmanship of the COM108. The SCO is a technical advisory committee to the COM and 
processes documentation from the ICM to COM. It also reports to the COM, must meet at 
least four times a year and decision-making is by consensus109. 
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3.6 The Secretariat 
 
The Secretariat is the principal executive institution of SADC whose mandate spans across 
a range of activities and such are specifically enumerated in the Treaty110. The Secretariat 
is headed by the Executive Secretary whose duties are also specifically enumerated in the 
Treaty111. 
 
3.6.1 Functions of the Secretariat 
 
The Secretariat is responsible for planning and managing SADC’s programmes, 
coordination and harmonisation of the policies and strategies of member states, monitoring 
and evaluation of regional policies and programmes, gender mainstreaming in all SADC 
programmes, implementation of decisions of the various SADC institutions as well as 
organisation and management of SADC meetings112. The Secretariat is also responsible for 
financial and general administration of SADC projects, devising appropriate strategies for 
self financing and income generating activities and investments, development of capacity, 
infrastructure and maintenance of intra-regional information communication technology 
and undertaking research on Community building and the integration processes113. The 
Secretariat also has a responsibility to prepare and submit to the COM for approval, 
administrative regulations, standing orders and rules of management of SADC affairs114.  
The secretariat’s mandate also permeates into the diplomatic realm by having the 
responsibility of representation and promotion of SADC on the international fora.115 
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It is noteworthy that the SADC secretariat is typical of many an international organisation 
as its room for manoeuvre is severely circumscribed. The SADC Secretariat is a weak 
institution and it appears that the Executive Secretary cannot take any concrete decisions 
and act on them without approval from the COM. The Treaty however on the other hand 
confirms the supranationality aspect of SADC by explicitly stating that the member states 
shall respect the international character and responsibilities of SADC, the Executive 
Secretary and other staff of SADC and shall not seek to influence them in the discharge of 
their functions116.  
 
It is also worthwhile to point out that the members of the SADC Tribunal, who are for all 
intents and purposes, despite the nomenclature, in fact judges of that court, the Executive 
Secretary and the other staff of SADC are enjoined to be committed to the international 
character of SADC and shall not seek or receive instructions from any member states or 
from any authority external to SADC117. It cannot be gainsaid that this is a positive 
development in SADC’s integration project as it is crystal clear that unlike the other 
institutions discussed above, the Secretarial is a truly supranational institution within 
SADC whose emphasis is on SADC development and not on advancing national interests. 
Perhaps this explains the approach taken by member states, through the Treaty, to make 
sure that the Secretariat remains a weak institution. One might surmise that such an 
institutional set-up might have been occasioned by the member states’ unwillingness to 
lose control of the SADC integration project. Doubtlessly, any cession of more powers to 
the Secretariat will be coupled with concomitant loss of sovereign competencies in certain 
areas. It is to be regretted that the Secretariat remains an exceedingly weak institution 
despite the fact that it is one of the few truly apolitical institutions in the regional body’s 
institutional milieu. Proposals for institutional reformation will be fully addressed in the 
final chapter of this work and it needs no emphasis that the SADC secretariat will be a 
leading contender for such reformation if the goal of true integration is to be attained. 
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 3.7 The SADC Tribunal 
 
The SADC Tribunal (‘the Tribunal’) is the judicial organ of the community with 
jurisdiction over contentious and non contentious proceedings. The Treaty explicitly 
provides for the Tribunal to be the institution mandated to ensure adherence to and the 
proper interpretation of the provisions of the SADC Treaty and subsidiary instruments and 
to adjudicate upon such disputes as may be referred to it118. It is further provided that the 
Tribunal shall also give advisory opinions on any matter submitted to it by the Summit and 
the Council and that the decisions of the Tribunal shall be final and binding119 though it is 
not fully elaborated on whom such decisions binding but one can only surmise that 
decisions of that Court shall be binding upon the parties to the adjudication proceedings 
and in respect of the matter under consideration. It is submitted that other member states 
and institutions are enjoined to take account of the legal principles enunciated by the 
Tribunal as such will constitute persuasive authority.  A protocol expounding the 
composition, powers, functions and procedures of the Tribunal (‘the Tribunal Protocol’)120 
was adopted by the Summit which also provided for the Court to have its seat in Windhoek, 
Namibia. 
 
3.7.1 Composition and Jurisdiction of the Tribunal 
 
The Tribunal protocol provides that the Tribunal shall be composed of not less than 10 
judges from nationals of member states who possess the qualifications for appointment to 
the highest judicial offices in their respective states and are jurists of recognised 
competence121.  The Tribunal protocol further provides that the Council shall designate five 
judges who shall sit regularly on the  Tribunal and the additional five judges shall 
                                                 
118 Article 16 of the SADC Treaty 
119 Ibid  
120 See Protocol on Tribunal and Rules of Procedure Thereof  adopted on 7th August 2000 
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constitute a pool from which the president may invite a judge to sit on the Tribunal 
whenever a regular judge is temporarily unavailable to carry out his/her functions122. The 
Tribunal elects its president from the crop of judges whose term shall be for a period of 
three years123. The judges’ terms and conditions of service, salaries and benefits are 
determined by the COM124.  
 
The Tribunal Protocol specifically provides that the Tribunal shall have jurisdiction in the 
interpretation and application of the Treaty, protocols and all subsidiary instruments 
adopted within SADC as well as acts of SADC institutions125. The Tribunal is further 
specifically mandated to adjudicate matters specifically provided for in any other 
agreements that member states may conclude among themselves or within the community 
and which confer jurisdiction on the Tribunal126. It specifically states that any dispute over 
the interpretation or application of the agreement or supplementary agreements between the 
two parties that could not be settled otherwise shall be referred to the Tribunal for an 
advisory opinion127. The Tribunal has jurisdiction over disputes between natural or legal 
persons and states though a natural or legal person can only litigate at the Tribunal after 
having exhausted all available remedies or (emphasis added) is unable to proceed under the 
domestic jurisdiction128.  
 
The Tribunal has jurisdiction between member states and SADC or any of its 
institutions,129exclusive jurisdiction over disputes between non state entities and SADC or 
any of its institutions130, exclusive jurisdiction over disputes  between SADC and its 
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staff131 as well as the rendering of advisory opinions at the request of the Summit or the 
Council132. It is to be further noted that the consent of either party to be subject to the 
Tribunal’s jurisdiction shall not be required133. It is also worthwhile to note from the above 
that the non-state litigant is not required to exhaust domestic remedies where the non-state 
actor is unable to proceed under the domestic jurisdiction. The ingenuity with which the 
provision providing for exhaustion of local remedies was drafted merits further comment 
for its dynamism. The provision stipulates that the non-state actor shall have exhausted all 
available remedies- before litigating at the Tribunal. It is quite clear that the non state 
litigant is not entitled to exhaust all domestic remedies within the national jurisdiction but 
is entitled to exhaust available remedies. It is submitted that availability of domestic 
remedies is interlinked with effectiveness and this is consistent with the approach taken by 
international tribunals elsewhere. In a seminal judgement on the issue the Inter American 
Court of Human Rights134 held that for a remedy to be held to be available entails that it 
must be effective-that is capable of producing the result for which it was designed. The 
court further stated that when it is shown that remedies are denied for trivial reasons or 
without examination of the merits, or if there is proof of the existence of a practice or 
policy ordered or tolerated by the government, the effect of which is to impede certain 
persons from invoking internal remedies that would normally be available to others-resort 
to those remedies becomes a senseless formality135. The tenor of such a finding is that 
ineffective remedies are as good as being unavailable and in such circumstances a litigant 
is not obliged to engage in a senseless formality by pursuing ineffective internal remedies 
as such are unavailable and such a position is consistent with the Tribunal Protocol136. 
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To ensure an effective and uniform application of SADC law within the region, national 
courts of member states may turn to the Tribunal to give preliminary rulings on any issue 
before the national court or national tribunal relating to SADC aqui. As for the applicable 
law the Tribunal Protocol states that  the Tribunal shall apply the Treaty, the Protocols and 
all subsidiary instruments adopted by the Summit, by the Council or other institutions or 
organs of the SADC pursuant to the SADC Treaty or any of its protocols137. The Tribunal 
Protocol further provides that the Tribunal shall develop its own community jurisprudence 
having regard to applicable treaties, general principles and rules of public international law 
and any rules and principles of the law of States138. The Tribunal Protocol further states 
that the decisions and rulings of the Tribunal shall be final and binding139 as indicated 
above. 
 
It must be noted from the foregoing that the Tribunal is a truly supranational institution of 
SADC apart from the Secretariat and such a development is reflective of the 
constitutionalism taking place in SADC. Despite the nomenclature of referring to judges as 
members in the tribunals and the use of the noun ‘tribunal’ rather than court- which may 
have been a tactical ploy to make the entity acceptable to the member states- the SADC 
Tribunal is a court of justice for all intents and purposes and one can be forgiven for daring 
to say that it is now the highest court in the SADC region, at least when it relates to SADC 
law. It must also be noted that the judges of the Tribunal enjoy immunity from legal 
proceedings in respect of anything said or done in their judicial capacity140 and they are 
also enjoined to execute their judicial duties in an independent and impartial manner141. 
The judges are also enjoined to refrain from actions which compromise their positions as 
international staff responsible only to SADC and shall not seek nor receive instructions 
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from any member states or any authority external to SADC142.  It must also be noted that 
the Tribunal Protocol forms an integral part of the Treaty hence upon being a SADC 
member, a state is automatically bound by the Tribunal Protocol without any need for 
ratification- a sure sign of the constitutionalisation taking place in SADC! 
 
One hopes that member states courts will utilise the reference procedure and refer cases to 
the tribunal for guidance on issue relating to SADC law. This will help in building a 
symbiotic and complementary relationship between the national courts and the community 
court. Such a co-operative and complementary procedure will help in the development of 
uniform norms and values for the regional community to which the people of the region 
can have recourse to. 
 
3.8 SADC National Committees 
 
3.8.1 Composition and Functions 
 
The treaty provides that each member state shall create a SADC National Committee 
(SNC) which shall consist of key stakeholders143 and these are stated as the government, 
private sector, civil society, non governmental organisations and workers and employer’s 
organisations. National steering committees and subcommittees to be chaired by duly 
elected chairpersons are envisaged to be created under the rubric of the SNCs144. Member 
states are enjoined to create national secretariats to facilitate the operation of SNCs and 
each SNC secretariat is enjoined to produce periodic reports to the SADC Secretariat. It is 
to be observed that establishment of SNCs is pursuant to a solemn undertaking within the 
SADC Treaty-in particular the objectives of the Treaty ¨which, inter alia, seeks to involve 
the people of the Region in the process of regional integration as a way of fostering closer 
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relations among the communities, associations and people of the region145. The Treaty 
further states that the composition of the SNC shall reflect the core areas of integration146.  
 
The SNCs have the responsibility to provide the input at the national level in the 
formulation of SADC policies, strategies and programs of action, co-ordination and 
overseeing at the national level the implementation of SADC programmes of action. The 
SNC is mandated to meet at least four times a year147. 
 
It is clear that the raison d’être for the creation of SNCs is to facilitate the citizenry’s 
participation in the SADC integration project. It will need colossal effort from SADC to 
convince the SADC citizenry that it is committed towards engaging it. There is nothing on 
the ground to be enthusiastic about. There is a need for SADC to show that it is not just an 
elite pact of the regional bureaucracy by encouraging transnational engagement of the 
people of the region. Sight should however not be lost of the fact that the Treaty makes it 
hortatory that each member state ‘shall create a SADC National Committee’148 and that the 
SNC ‘shall consist of key stakeholders’.149 This doubtlessly creates a legal obligation for 
the member states to do so. It is hoped that the regional bureaucracy will not only involve 
but also genuinely listen to the stakeholders- that way SADC will have a resonance with 
the people of the region. 
 
 
3.9 THE SADC Parliamentary Forum 
 
The SADC Parliamentary Forum (SADC-PF) is not recognised treaty institution though its 
role towards the integration project in the region cannot be overemphasised. The Summit 
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approved the formation of the SADC-PF as an autonomous institution of SADC under the 
Treaty150 though it is not clear where the SADF-PF falls in the SADC institutional 
configuration given the Treaty’s silence on it. The constitution of the SADC-PF stipulates 
that it is a Parliamentary Consultative Assembly meant to develop into a regional 
parliamentary structure and that it is an international organisation in its own right, and that 
it may dissolve itself by a resolution supported by three quarters of its members151. The 
SADC-PF is composed of parliamentarians from national parliaments of member states and 
at present, thirteen parliaments from SADC states are represented by four parliamentarians 
from each member state.152   
 
3.9.1 Objectives of SADC-PF 
 
The SADC-PF has identified its objectives as strengthening the implementation capacity of 
SADC by involving parliamentarians in SADC activities, facilitation of the effective 
implementation of SADC policies and projects, the promotion of principles of human 
rights, gender equality, and democracy within the SADC region153. It is also the SADC-
PF’s objectives to familiarise the people of SADC countries with the aims and objectives of 
SADC, to inform SADC of popular views on development and other issues affecting 
SADC countries, to provide a forum for discussion of common interests to SADC and the 
promotion of peace, democracy, gender equality, stability and security on the basis of 
collective responsibility by supporting the development of permanent conflict resolution 
mechanisms in the SADC region154. 
 
It must be noted that due to its vague institutional status with regards to the main SADC 
institutions the SADC-PF is rendered toothless and finds itself more alienated from SADC 
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activities. This is mainly because of its tense relationship with the Summit as a result of its  
stance on the need for  SADC member states to uphold the rule of law, respect human 
rights and the imperative need to uphold democratic standards ensuring free and fair 
elections, a development which culminated in it not being invited to monitor the Zimbabwe 
elections in March 2005 and March 2008 after having acerbically criticised the elections 
held in that country in 2000 and 2002155.  
 
3.10 Decision-making in SADC Institutions 
 
The SADC Treaty affirms the pre-eminence of consensus decision-making in the adoption 
of institutional acts by the bulk of SADC’s institutions156. This approach is in 
contradistinction to the absolutist conception of state sovereignty which dominated much of 
the 19th century which entailed as a consequence the general application of the rule of 
unanimity157. The consensus approach thus forecloses the potential paralysation of an 
organisation’s decision making process associated with the rule of unanimity, which 
requires the affirmative votes of all the member states. The SADC Treaty provides for the 
various institutions of SADC to take decisions by consensus, which has become the 
tradition in SADC from its inception in 1980158. The Treaty provides that the Summit, 
which is the highest organ of the Community, shall make binding decisions by consensus 
unless there is a provision to the contrary159. Consensus decision-making is also entrenched 
in the Treaty in respect of the OPDS160, the Council161, the ICM162 and the SCO163. The 
Treaty has strangely taken it for granted regarding the need for an alternative procedure in 
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the case of lack of consensus as it does not specifically provide for a procedure to be 
adopted should there be no consensus. One can surmise that logically the issue has to be 
put to vote but again, without an explicit provision that creates its own problems as to 
whether the act should be adopted by a simple majority or by way of a qualified majority. 
 
The Treaty does exclude the resort to decision-making by consensus in certain 
circumstances. Unanimity is required where it relates to the admission of a new member by 
the Summit164, majority requirement is required for Judges of the Tribunal adjudicating 
over a specific case165 and three-quarters assent from the entire SADC membership is 
required to pass a resolution dissolving SADC166 as well as amendment of the Treaty167. 
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    CHAPTER FOUR 
 
 
4. The Legal and Constitutional Issues Arising From SADC Integration 
 
The SADC integration protect, like other regional communitarisation endeavours 
invariably raises a plethora of issues and varied interpretations of the real nature of the 
relationship between SADC institutions and the national institutions. It would even be a 
futile exercise to try delineating the proper boundaries of the supranational entity as the 
Treaty is deliberately vague and incomplete in other areas and most significantly the 
regional entity is in a state of flux with rapid changes constantly taking place some of 
which have fundamentally altered its character thereby defying any attempt to classify 
SADC as a classic international organisation. This chapter will focus on an analysis of the 
relationship between the SADC institutions and the national institutions, the legal aspects 
arising from such an institutional set-up, the constitutionalisation of SADC currently in 
vogue and the issues spawned by such developments. 
 
4.1 Legal Status of SADC 
 
The SADC treaty provides that ‘SADC shall be an international organisation, and shall 
have legal personality with capacity and power to enter into contract, acquire...property... 
sue and be sued’168. It is further provided that in the territory of each member state, the 
regional organisation shall have the apposite legal competencies as is necessary in the 
proper exercise of its functions169.  The preamble to the treaty also states that the affairs of 
the organisation shall be conducted bearing in mind the principles of public international 
law, which principles are elaborated in Article 4 of the Treaty which states, inter alia, that 
SADC and its member states shall act in accordance to the principles of sovereign equality 
of all member states, solidarity peace and security, equity, balance and mutual benefit, 
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peaceful settlements of disputes and most curiously human rights, democracy and the rule 
of law. Despite the aforementioned declaration, which predictably may have been inserted 
to ally the concerns of some member states of loosing control of some of their sovereign 
competencies, it is submitted that SADC is not an ordinary intergovernmental organisation 
in the traditional sense of the word. I will endeavour to show below that in as much as it 
retains some basic features of an intergovernmental organisation in some areas, SADC has,  
on the other hand, mutated beyond the classical strictures of intergovernmentalism in 
certain areas, which in my opinion makes it eligible to be classified as a sui generis entity 
as will be shown below. 
 
4.2 Freedom of Movement 
It is clearly stipulated in its constitutive instrument that one of the key objectives of SADC 
is the development of policies aimed at the progressive elimination of obstacles to the free 
movement of capital and labour, goods and services and of the people of the region170. It is 
noted that in pursuance of the above SADC adopted a protocol (the ‘Freedom of Movement 
Protocol’)171 to facilitate the free movement of persons within the region. Although it is not 
yet operational pending ratification by two thirds of the SADC membership172, it is the 
statement of intent that is fundamental - the symbolism encapsulated by such endeavours. 
The Freedom of Movement protocol states in its preamble that: 
Full popular participation in building the Region into a Community is only 
possible where the citizens of the community enjoy freedom of movement, 
namely; visa free entry, residence and establishment in the territories of the 
member states. (the emphasis is mine)173. 
The Protocol enjoins member states to harmonise their relevant national laws with its 
provisions, in particular that states must enact the apposite legislative, judicial, 
administrative and other measures necessary for the implementation and effective 
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achievement of its objectives,174 and the standardisation of immigration procedures, grant 
of residence, abolition of visas for a ninety-day stay in the territory of another state among 
others175. Although the protocol has stirred a hornet’s nest with some member states fearful 
of the grim prospect of an influx of large groups of persons who may overwhelm their 
infrastructure, it is noteworthy that the protocol was signed by half of the SADC 
membership at its adoption, a not insignificant number given its controversial nature. The 
Protocol states in no nebulous terms that the raison d’tre of the integration project is the 
‘building of a community’176 and daringly envisages ‘citizens of the community’177 
moving freely within the community. The very limited scope of this work will not allow for 
a fuller exposition of the complex concept of community citizenship but it is worthy stating 
that rather than creating a classical international organisation where intergovenmntalism is 
the order of the day, it is beyond doubt, particularly with the consecration of the concept of 
freedom of movement of persons and the banding around of citizenship talk, that SADC is 
mutating into a sui generis legal entity which defies pigeonholing as a classical 
international organisation. 
 
4.3 Common Foreign and Security Policy 
 
It is to be further noted that in order to achieve its objectives, SADC has also undertaken to 
promote the co-ordination and harmonisation of the international relations of its member 
states178.  What can be discerned of late in SADC is that the member states are now 
speaking with one voice on issues of international concern and examples abound in that 
respect. At the Rome Conference for the adoption of the Rome Statute establishing the 
International Criminal Court (‘ICC’)179, SADC member states did not participate 
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individually but participated as a group with a common position and South Africa was 
mandated to address the delegates on behalf of the entire membership of the regional 
grouping180. SADC further spoke with one voice in its unequivocal rejection of 
AFRICOM, a United States Military Command envisaged to be set up on the continent. 
SADC member states interpreted such a development as a concerted move by the United 
States to spread its hegemonic tentacles. The regional community has further established a 
military force, called SADCBRIG, to be dispatched to any hot spot, be it within the region 
or elsewhere in Africa for peace-keeping purposes and handling of emergencies and 
isasters.181  
 some areas in favour of the Community is 
aptly ca
with the objectives of 
SADC and the objectives of this Treaty.183(emphasis added) 
d
 
It must also be remarked from the above observation, that membership in SADC in many 
ways circumscribes the state’s room of manoeuvre, particularly in its international 
intercourse - a position which may prima facie be perceived as an affront of such hallowed 
principles enshrined in the Charter of the UN such as sovereign equality of all member 
states,182 which is the hallmark of intergovenmentalism. That the member states’ 
sovereignty prerogatives have been invaded in
ptured by the Treaty which states that: 
Member states ...may enter into agreements with other states, regional and 
international organisations whose objectives are compatible 
 
 This is because member states of the regional entity have undertaken to develop common 
foreign approaches on issues of mutual concern.184.  It is noteworthy that the OPDSC 
Protocol even envisages the use of force to rein a delinquent member should pacific means 
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of resolving the dispute fail.185 Member states are further enjoined to develop democratic 
institutions and practices within their territories and encourage the observance of human 
rights186. It is beyond doubt that member states have derogated from their classical 
prerogatives in the conduct of their affairs, both internally and extraterritorially. In other 
words they have to abide by a new norm- the SADC aqui to which they have voluntarily 
bound themselves in the spirit of the time-honoured principle of pacta sunt servanda- 
which is enshrined in the VCLT187. The Treaty further states, though with some vagueness, 
that member states have agreed to co-operate in such areas as food security, land and 
agriculture, trade, science and technology, natural resources and environment, social 
welfare, politics, diplomacy, international relations, peace and security among others188. It 
is noteworthy that the COM has the powers to determine further areas of co-operation189. 
SADC therefore replicates what the ECJ said forty-five years ago within the context of the 
then EEC when it controversially but correctly proclaimed in the famous case of van Gend 
&Loos that the Community ‘constitutes a new legal order of international law for the 
benefit of which states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit in limited fields’ 190. The 
bove historic words are spot on with regards to the current developments in SADC. a
 
The above enumerated developments within SADC doubtlessly deprive the regional entity 
of that badge of intergovernmentalism, the key feature of classical international 
organisations. What can also be discerned is SADC’s move towards the empowering of the 
individuals though still at a rudimentary level but nevertheless a symbolic development 
which will in the foreseeable future prove of great significance in the integration project. 
This is manifestly reflected as pointed out above, in the jurisdiction of the SADC tribunal 
which is empowered not only to entertain claims from member states but also natural and 
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legal persons from the territories of the member states- hardly a feature consistent with 
traditional international organisations where the states are the main and more often than 
not, the
what th
therefore 
ze with such legal spectacles at the regional metamorphosis currently 
btaining in SADC. These factors, taken cumulatively do quite clearly put SADC on a sui 
ris
social and cultural systems of the applicant state with the SADC region, as well as the 
                                                
 sole players. Such developments within SADC have resulted in the removal of  
at celebrated legal scholar Weiler referred to as: 
the central legal artefact of international law: the notion of exclusive state 
responsibility with the concomitant principles of reciprocity and 
countermeasures....a truly contained legal regime with no recourse to the 
mechanism of state responsibility, at least as traditionally understood and 
no reciprocity and countermeasures...without these features so central to the classic 
international legal order, the community truly becomes something new191. 
Although still at its rudimentary stage in comparison with the EU, it is not wholly 
ambitious to ga
o
gene  footing. 
 
4.4 Criteria for Admission into SADC 
The Treaty specifically provides that the Summit has the discretion of admitting any new 
member by a unanimous decision after recommendations from the COM192. The Summit is 
enjoined to determine the criteria and procedures for admission of such new members 
though membership of SADC shall be subject to no reservations193. Admission to SADC is 
currently governed by the admission criteria approved by the Summit in August 2003 and 
augmented in August 2004194. The criteria provides, inter alia, that the applicant state 
should be ‘well versed with and share SADC’s ideals and aspirations195’ set out in the 
SADC Treaty, and curiously, that there must be a commonality of political, economic, 
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observance of the principles of democracy, human rights, good governance and the rule of 
law in accordance with the African Charter of Human and People’s Rights196, that the 
applicant should have a good track record and ability to honour its obligations and to 
participate effectively and efficiently in the SADC Programme of Action (SPA) for the 
benefit of the Community, that the applicant should not be at war and should not be 
involved or engaged in subversive and destabilisation activities, nor have any territorial 
ambitions against SADC, any of its member states or any member states of the African 
Union.197 It is further provided that the applicant should have levels of macroeconomic 
indicators in line with targets set in the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan 
(RISDP), SADC’s blue print for economic development, and that former SADC members 
ay only be readmitted after settling out any outstanding arrears198. 
                                                
m
 
It is noteworthy that one of the admission criteria postulated is the need for observance of 
the principles of democracy, human rights, good governance and the rule of law. Such a 
development represents an avant-garde as member states will be precluded from raising 
state sovereignty or act of state when challenged on the treatment of their own nationals. 
The Southern African political landscape ranges from strong democracies to autocracies 
and indeed almost a quarter of SADC members have Freedom House199’s lowest score 
possible (that of 7). One is therefore left with a paradoxical situation where most of the 
SADC members, especially the gross violators of human rights were there at its launching, 
did not have to apply for membership and did not have to meet any criterion besides being 
in southern Africa and have continued with their undemocratic practices. This makes it a 
pipe dream to fathom ‘...common political values, systems and other shared values which 
are transmitted through institutions which are democratic...’200 in the foreseeable future.  
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The situation is even worsened by the fact that the regional body tends to take a 
condescending and lukewarm approach rather than calling undemocratic regimes to 
account and its so-called policy of ‘quiet diplomacy’ to the governance crisis in Zimbabwe 
is a poignant point.  Be that as it may, it must however be noted that despite the pessimism 
expressed above,  what we are seeing in southern Africa is a gradual move towards a 
uniform application of SADC norms throughout its legal space and it takes no particular 
insight to suggest that the region is slowly slithering towards a supranational order with a 
onstitutional base. 
.5 Relationship between SADC Law and National Law 
ill be of 
ssistance should there be a divergence between the national law and SADC law.   
 
                                                
c
 
4
 
Member states are enjoined to take all necessary steps to accord the SADC Treaty the force 
of national law and to ensure its uniform application in their domestic jurisdictions.201The 
states are further prohibited from taking any measures likely to jeopardise the sustenance of 
SADC’s principles, the achievement of its objectives and the implementation of the 
provisions of the Treaty202.  Although the Treaty does not expressly encapsulates a 
‘supremacy clause’ it is quite clear that SADC norms, within the Community’s area of 
competence constitute a higher law and where there is a conflict with a member state’s 
national law, it is respectfully submitted that SADC law will trump national law. This is 
because the SADC Treaty expressly prohibits member states from taking any measures 
(including the passing of legislation) which jeopardises the implementation of SADC 
treaties203.  This appears to be an express statement that as long as SADC has legislated in 
a specific area, member states may not partake of any measures whose effect will be to 
derogate from such. It will have been helpful though for the SADC Treaty to state 
expressly as to the relationship between national law and SADC law as such w
a
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It is worthwhile to make reference to the SADC Court’s inaugural case which is currently 
pending at the time of writing of this thesis, in which both a legal and natural persons have 
filed a petition against the government of Zimbabwe for alleged violation of SADC norms 
such as respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law in respect of the latter’s 
land reform program204. In granting a temporary reprieve to the applicants, the Tribunal 
had this to say: 
                                                
.......SADC as a collectivity and as individual member states are under a 
legal obligation to respect and protect human rights of SADC citizens. They 
also have to ensure that there is democracy and the rule of law within the 
region205.  
The applicant was challenging a constitutional provision enshrined in the constitution of 
Zimbabwe which ousted the jurisdiction of the Zimbabwean courts from adjudicating in 
matters concerning land acquisition. The SADC Court’s jurisprudence in its inaugural case 
quite clearly settles the point that SADC law reigns supreme over conflicting national law. 
It is therefore submitted that being the law of the land SADC norms may be invoked by 
individuals in their national courts, which are duty bound to grant the appropriate remedy 
as if they were enacted by the national legislature. 
 
4.6 Non-ratification and Direct Effect 
 
The Treaty provides that a Protocol (SADC instruments of implementation) shall be 
binding only on the member states that are party to the Protocol in question206. The 
approach taken by SADC of implementing its programs by way of protocols which must be 
subject to ratification raises considerable legal and constitutional issues and potentially may 
prove to be a cul de suc in its integration drive. This is because even if a member state has 
signed the relevant protocol bestowing rights to the individuals within its jurisdiction but 
fails to ratify it, it is highly unlikely that the SADC tribunal will hold the state in question 
 
204 See Mike Campbell and Anor v Republic of Zimbabwe. 
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to be in violation of SADC aqui even though the protocol in question may have entered 
into force in respect of other members. This is because the Treaty, at least by implication 
seems to implicitly cater for variable geometry. It will be interesting to see how the SADC 
tribunal will adjudicate such cases particularly where it is alleged that a member state has 
violated a fundamental norm of SADC provided in a protocol which the state in question 
has not ratified.  It is noteworthy that it was the ECJ, in an act of unprecedented judicial 
activism, coined the judicial doctrine of direct effect in 1963 in Van Gend en Loos207 and 
developed subsequently, postulated that where Community legal norms are clear, precise, 
and self-sufficient must be regarded as the law of the land in the domain of application of 
Community law.  If genuine integration has to be achieved, it will be important for the 
SADC tribunal to take a leaf from the ECJ which has been credited as being the engine 
behind European integration agenda. It is thus important that the SADC Tribunal makes an 
explicit pronouncement on direct effect of SADC law as long as such legislation meets the 
threshold cited above, that is clear, precise and self sufficient-and that way can the Court 
play a cardinal role in the promotion of common political values and respect for human 
rights and the rule of law, progressive elimination of obstacles to the free movement of 
capital, labour, goods, services and the people of SADC. 
 
4.7 SADC and Human Rights 
 
There is an organic relationship between human rights and integration and it is not possible 
to build sustainable integration without human rights guarantees208. The SADC Treaty 
seems to be alive to that imperative need as it specifically states in its Preamble that the 
guarantee of democratic rights, observance of human rights and the rule of law, inter alia, 
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are central to the integration process209. Article 4 of the Treaty makes it crystal clear that 
one of the principles which member states shall abide to in their activities is respect for 
human rights, democracy and rule of law. This is further augmented elsewhere where it is 
stated that the objectives of SADC shall be to promote common political values, systems 
and other shared values which are transmitted through institutions that are democratic, 
legitimate and effective and member states are enjoined not to discriminate against any 
person on ground of gender, religion, political ties, race, ethnic origin, culture, ill health, 
disability or such other ground as may be determined by the Summit210. Article 2 of the 
OPDSC unequivocally states that one of the objectives of that entity is to promote the 
development of democratic institutions and practices within the territories of the member 
states and encourage observance of universal human rights as provided for in the Charter of 
the UN and the Convention of the African Union211. The SADC Tribunal in its first case 
referred to above stated that SADC  as a collectivity and as individual member states are 
under a legal obligation to respect and protect human rights of SADC citizens and ensure 
that there is democracy and rule of law within member states212. 
 
The above normative framework does point to a drift towards constitutionalisation of the 
SADC polity, which can only come to fruition through the establishment of constitutional 
norms which would prove as the bulwark against violation of the rights of citizenry by the 
member states or the Community. It must however be noted that the Treaty does not 
contain a Bill of Rights against which the SADC citizenry can enforce their human rights. 
The argument could be that the SADC Tribunal can always take note of fundamental rights 
as enshrined in the respective constitutions of the member states and constitutional 
traditions common to all member states and the human rights conventions to which the 
member states are parties to. It must be pointed out that some member states have 
draconian legislation such as Zimbabwe with its harsh media and security laws which 
                                                 
209 See SADC Treaty Preamble-paragraph 11. 
210 Ibid-Article 6.  
211 See Article 2 of the Protocol on OPDS 
212 See Mike Campbell and Anor v Republic of Zimbabwe 
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cannot pass any constitutional test but have only survived thus far at the mercy of an 
extremely compliant and compromised judiciary. It must further be noted that some of the 
SADC states such as Namibia, Botswana, Mauritius and South Africa have a well 
established constitutional tradition to which the SADC Court can refer to and that clearly 
creates tension with well known violators of human rights with their perverse human rights 
records who may feel that ‘alien’ legal norms are being imposed on them. A further 
complication is that some of the states are not parties to the major human rights 
instruments, for instance a state like Zimbabwe which has a well chronicled history of 
massive violations of human rights is not party to such important human rights instruments 
as the Torture Convention.213 
 
It is therefore a matter of urgent necessity that SADC adopts a justiciable Bill of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of the individual as the linchpin of the new regional 
order as without such guarantees there is no way the SADC integration project can cobble 
up a free market economy in which factors of production can flow unencumbered within 
the supranational entity. Member states must further be compelled to guarantee such human 
rights at the national level which must be consonant with the rights provided for at the 
regional level to ensure uniformity of application of norms in the region as well as legal 
certainty – a process which will by far advance the integration project on a credible basis 
and guarantee its acceptance by the people of southern Africa. 
 
 
4.8 Institutional Balance 
 
The metamorphosis of SADC over the years in its integration agenda has led to an 
increasingly labyrinthine institutional configuration. Perhaps such is reflective of the 
inherent tension between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism. The result has been a 
                                                 
213 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment adopted on 
10th December 1984. 
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confusing, less coherent, opaque and ambiguous institutional architecture which does not 
augur well for the future. 
 
The Summit of the SADC is endowed with executive functions when it dictates the overall 
direction and control and functions of SADC214as well as appointing the Executive 
Secretary of SADC and appointment of judges of the Tribunal and admission of new 
members. The same institution also possesses legislative functions through its adoption of 
protocols for the implementation of various provisions of the Treaty215as well as any 
amendments to the Treaty216. The Summit is also imbued with judicial functions as it is 
mandated by the Treaty to determine any sanctions which may be imposed on any member 
which persistently fails to fulfil its obligations under the Treaty217. It must be noted that the 
powers exercised by the Summit are essentially political although couched in the language 
of objectivity. The above unsatisfactory state of affairs is compounded by the veil of 
secrecy which is notorious with SADC summits. The fundamental problem with this state 
of affairs is that the Summit is composed of Heads of States or Government as alluded to 
elsewhere, who, more often than not, have no legislative powers under their own national 
laws. Even in the event that they have such legislative powers under their municipal 
systems, such legislation would be in most cases under the microscopic gazes of their 
national parliaments as well as the national judiciary to which such legislation may be 
subjected to judicial oversight should there be a reasonable basis to do so. Of course the 
argument could be that most of the protocols are subject to ratification by national 
parliaments hence that provides a safeguard.  It  must be noted though that not all of them 
have to be ratified by each member state before they can be operational, chief amongst of 
them being the Protocol on the Tribunal218 and the Tourism Protocol, and with respect to 
                                                 
214 See SADC Treaty-Article 10 
215 Ibid-Article 22. 
216 Ibid-Article 36. 
217 Ibid-Article 33. 
218 SADC Protocol on Tourism signed by the Heads of State and Government at Mauritius on 14th  
September 1998. 
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the latter it is provided that it shall form an integral part of the SADC Treaty upon its entry 
into force upon ratification by two thirds of the membership219.  The legal implication is 
that those members who have not ratified it through their national and constitutional 
processes will nevertheless be bound once it enters into force.   
 
The COM is also not exempted from a bizarre institutional setup. It must be remembered 
that the COM is composed of Ministers responsible for foreign or external affairs yet its 
remit includes overseeing the implementation and execution of SADC affairs, advising the 
Summit on issues of policy, recommending persons for appointment to the position of 
Executive Secretary and Deputy Executive Secretary of SADC and other personnel 
functions220, as well as the responsibility the selecting and recommending the Summit for 
appointment the judges of the SADC Tribunal221. It is to be noted that unlike the Council 
of the EU whose composition changes depending on the subject matter under discussion, in 
SADC you will have an extremely curious situation where the foreign ministers of member 
states will be responsible for formulating policies on agricultural issues, economic affairs, 
justice issues, health related concerns, fishing policies as well as personnel and budgetary 
duties. Oosthuizen has rightly lamented that the entire SADC institutional device is 
composed by ministers of some sort at the expense of national officers which results in 
what he refers to as a top heavy, ministerial micro management, which in his view, is not 
the cheapest or most effective and expeditious way of going about SADC business222. The 
above analysis clearly exposes an unprecedented level of institutional imbalance with the 
Summit and COM having enormous powers which by and large remain unchecked. This is 
even more worrisome given that the constitutive treaties, both of SADC and its Tribunal do 
not expressly grant the latter inherent powers to review the executive, administrative or any 
community actions exercised by any of the SADC institutions which gives a lot of leeway 
for abuse of power by the bureaucrats. 
                                                 
219 Ibid-Article 2. 
220 See SADC Treaty-Article 11 
221 See Article 5 of the Tribunal Protocol 
222 See Oosthuizen(2006) p322 
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4.8.1 Case for a Directly Elected Parliament? 
 
The SADC institutional architecture as outlined above clearly calls for the adoption of 
necessary community measures to counterbalance and monitor the executive (Summit and 
COM) while providing democratic legitimacy to SADC. It is submitted that this can only 
be achieved through the adoption of a protocol and the amendment of the Treaty to 
establish a directly elected SADC parliament which will be the highest legislative body of 
the regional entity with greater control of community legislation. It is only through such a 
measure that SADC can be more responsive to the needs of the region’s peoples and ensure 
transparency and accountability to the integration process. The current institutional 
structure reflects a deep tension, a concerted need by the member states to have a 
stranglehold on SADC which reflects itself in a single institution exercising a myriad of 
responsibilities-executive, judicial and legislative - something which runs counter to 
separation of powers-a cardinal principle governing any democratic system. 
 
The case for a  SADC parliament directly elected by universal suffrage  is even made 
compelling given the fact that the current SADC-PF, as elucidated in the previous chapter, 
is not a formal SADC institution and in any case it is just an assembly of individual 
legislators from national parliaments and to all intents and purposes, is a very weak 
institution with a strained relationship with the Summit.  This has resulted in it being totally 
overlooked in the SADC integration process. Even though there is a requirement for 
ratification of SADC instruments by the constitutional processes of the member states (at 
least the majority of them), it is my submission that such is not a guarantee for the 
involvement of the SADC citizens neither does it lend legitimacy to an integration process 
where almost all SADC member states but a few are de facto one party states with almost 
half of them having demonstrated their inability or lack of capacity or gratuitous 
unwillingness to hold genuine, transparent, legitimate and credible elections which can be 
regarded as reflective of the will of the people. For the foregoing reasons, an integration 
process endorsed by national parliamentarians who are themselves not the bona fide 
representatives of the people of the region but a clique of electoral fraudsters does not lend 
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any legitimacy to the integration process.  A directly elected SADC parliament can go a 
long way to guaranteeing that the integration project is a people-driven one as well as 
lending institutional balance to the current skewed structure. 
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   CHAPTER FIVE 
 
 
5. An Overview of The Relationship Between SADC and the African Union  
 
The SADC Treaty provides that member states may enter into other forms of co-operation 
and agreements with other states, regional and international organisations whose objectives 
are compatible with that of SADC and the provisions of the Treaty223. The preamble to the 
Treaty further makes reference to the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos of 
1980, the Treaty establishing the African Economic Community and the Constitutive Act 
of the AU as some of its guiding principles224. This chapter will discuss the relationship 
between the SADC and the African Union (AU) and how the former fits in the latter’s 
cherished scheme for the creation of an African supranational entity.  
 
5.1 Relationship between SADC and the AU 
 
The AU, the predecessor to the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) was established in 
2000 by the Constitutive Act of the African Union (the ‘AU Treaty’)225 which entered into 
force on 26th May 2001. The AU Treaty states in its preamble on the need to accelerate the 
process of implementing the Treaty establishing the African Economic Community (AEC) 
in order to promote the socio-economic development of Africa and to face more effectively 
the challenges posed by globalisation226. Among the declared objectives of the continental 
body include, inter alia, the achievement of greater unity and solidarity amongst the 
African countries and the people of Africa, acceleration of socio-economic integration of 
the continent, promotion of democratic principles and institutions and the coordination and 
                                                 
223 See SADC Treaty-Article 24 
224 See para 11of  Preamble  to  the SADC Treaty. 
225 Constitutive Act of the African Union signed at Lome, Togo on 11th July 2000. 
226 Ibid. Para 6 of the preamble. 
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harmonisation of the policies between the existing and future Regional Economic 
Communities (RECs) in the gradual attainment of the objectives of the Union227. 
 
The African leaders, working under the auspices of the OAU adopted in April 1980 the 
Lagos Plan of Action and the Lagos Final Act228. The leaders, through the aforesaid 
instruments expressed their unwavering commitment to the promotion of Africa’s 
economic integration in order to facilitate and reinforce economic and social development 
and integration of its economies and for the achievement of that, establishment of national, 
regional and sub regional institutions leading to an interdependent African economic 
community229.  It was within the framework of the Lagos Plan of Action and the Lagos 
Final Act that the African Heads of State and Government, at a summit of the OAU in 
1991, signed the Treaty establishing the African Economic Community (the ‘Treaty of 
Abuja’)230. It must be noted that within the scheme of the AEC, the RECs as SADC are 
building blocks towards the creation of a fully integrated and self sustaining and 
endogenous continental economic community to be established in six stages up to 2035. 
The AEC, although it was established more than a decade after SADC, sees the RECs as 
vital towards a total African union and has thus set, inter alia, the following as its 
objectives; strengthening of RECs and creation of new communities where necessary, 
stabilisation of tariffs, customs duties and other barriers to intra-community trade, 
establishment of a free trade area, establishment of an African Customs Union, 
establishment of an African Common Market leading to an African Monetary Union and an 
African Central Bank as well as the consolidation of the African Common Market through 
the free movement of people, goods, capital and services231. The integration process 
envisaged is all encompassing and transcends political, social and cultural sectors and 
                                                 
227 Ibid-see Article 3. 
228 Kouassi(2007) p3 
229 Ibid pp4-5. 
230 Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community signed by the OAU Heads of State or Government 
signed at Abuja, Nigeria on 3 June 1991. 
231 Ibid. 
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visualises the total political and economic unification of Africa as reflected in the 
Constitutive Treaty of the AU.  
 
It is also noteworthy that all the African regions have an integration process of some sort 
which as mentioned heretofore constitutes the building blocks for and lay the basis for total 
unification of Africa and these are SADC (southern Africa), Common Market of Eastern 
and Southern Africa (COMESA)-encompassing states from east and southern Africa, the 
East African Community (EAC)-(east Africa), the Economic Community of Central 
African States (ECCAS)-(central Africa), the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) (west Africa), the Community of Sahel-Saharan States(CEN-SAD) (north 
Africa), the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) and the Arab Maghreb 
Union (AMU) (north Africa)232. 
 
It must be remarked however that Africa is a continent of great variation in democratisation 
and as noted by one prominent scholar, such will prevent any serious economic and 
political union in Africa based on shared normative values unless African leaders commit 
themselves through walking the talk and embracing democratic values and it is only 
through such that institutions like SADC will give any real meaning to the people of 
southern Africa233. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
232 See Oosthuizen (2006) p98. 
233 Siaroff-Paper presented at the Biennial Congress of the European Union Studies Association, Montreal, 
Quebec, Canada, May 2007 p-10. 
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   CHAPTER SIX  
 
 
6. Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
The SADC integration agenda epitomises an historic economic and transnational co-
operation in Southern Africa into a transnational entity geared towards uniting the people 
of Southern Africa. The transformation has also witnessed a surgery and reconfiguration of 
SADC’s institutional structure to facilitate deeper integration and constitutionalisation of 
the SADC polity.  
 
The integration project has meant the cession of sovereign competencies by member states 
to the supranational bodies. The process has not been smooth though- there are still 
intractable challenges to be faced. There is obvious reluctance by the member states to 
subject themselves to oversight from supranational institutions. SADC’s slither towards 
deeper integration of the region is strewn with countless challenges, chief of which will be 
a friction between misguided statism on one hand and supranationalism on the other. The 
empty-chair crisis faced by the EU in its formative years and leading to the Luxembourg 
Accord234 is a testimony of such tension and SADC should expect the same as it trudges 
towards a supranational order.   
 
There is however an imperative need for a rationalisation of the SADC institutional 
structure with view curtailing excessive overloading of executive, judicial and legislative 
powers in the Summit and the Council. The composition of the COM should be a revolving 
one depending on the subject nature under discussion rather than the current state of affairs 
where it is composed of a fixed membership.  Institutional balance is crucial for SADC’s 
integration process and it is important to effect the necessary amendment to the Treaty to 
accord the SADC-PF the necessary recognition as an institution composed of directly 
                                                 
234 Gilbert(2003) 104 
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elected parliamentarians to enact necessary community legislation and bring balance to the 
institutional architecture. It is also important that the SADC Secretariat should be 
strengthened and be legislatively enabled to exercise general oversight over all SADC 
member states and institutions to ensure that they abide by the Treaty provisions and 
making sure measures taken by SADC are being properly implemented. It is also 
recommended that the Secretariat should be granted the right of initiative to draw proposals 
for SADC legislation. The SADC Tribunal should also be granted express powers to 
review any legislative, administrative or judicial acts of member states or of a SADC 
institution falling within the realm of the Community’s jurisdiction to make sure such acts 
are compatible with the Treaty and SADC’s objectives. 
 
The system of decision-making in SADC affirms the pre-eminence of consensus decision-
making in the adoption of institutional acts. It is however important for the SADC Treaty to 
provide an alterative voting procedure should there be failure of consensus. Qualified 
majority voting is more appealing on substantive issues and simple majority on procedural 
issues.  
 
SADC’s admission criteria also marks an audacious endeavour to empower SADC citizens 
in the integration process and signals a break with intergovernmentalism as observance of 
the principles of democracy and the rule of law in accordance with the African Charter on 
Human and People’s Rights is given pride of place and a member state involved in 
egregious violations of human rights of its people is precluded from raising sovereignty or 
act of state to shield itself from such wayward behaviour. It has been pointed out in this 
thesis  that member states of the regional entity are enjoined to accord SADC the force of 
national law  and the conclusion to be derived is that SADC norms within its area of 
competence constitutes a higher law and where there is a conflict with the member state’s 
national law, SADC law prevails. However it is important for the SADC Tribunal to give 
clarity on the supremacy of SADC law to forestall any potential recalcitrance by member 
states’ national institutions. In that regard it is imperative for SADC to add to its normative 
framework on human rights by adopting a regionally justiciable Bill of Human Rights 
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against which member states’ treatment of their citizens will be measured. It is also 
satisfactory to note that normative developments within SADC do point to a drift towards 
constitutionalism of the SADC polity- a development which can only come through to 
fuller realisation through the adoption of human rights norms which will constitute a 
bulwark against violation of the rights of the citizenry of the Community. 
 
It has also been noted that southern Africa is a region in a flux. The movement towards 
supranationalism by SADC represents to a greater extent a readjustment and modification 
of the basic concepts, norms and classical strictures of intergovernmentalism. Challenges 
lie ahead and as the EU integration project will illustrate, political diversity and 
macroeconomic disequilibria will impair consensus and there will always be reluctance by 
member states to surrender sovereign prerogatives. It must be emphasised that for any 
meaningful integration arrangement to succeed,  member states must be prepared to 
surrender their sovereign prerogatives to SADC, the need to uphold the primacy of the 
SADC law not only in areas of SADC’s exclusive jurisdiction but also in areas of 
concurrent jurisdiction, the imperative need to empower SADC citizens, development of 
uniform institutions, political values, respect for the rule of law and human rights of the 
citizenry must be respected, protected and guaranteed anywhere in the region with robust 
judicial remedies for any encroachment. Not heeding to the above will relegate SADC’s 
infantile trudge towards a supranational order to a mirage, a mere forum for talk shows by 
the regional bureaucrats but with no meaning or resonance with the SADC citizenry. 
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